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Volume 72 (2017), 8

Articles

(Original title: Falzifikácia a paradox inferencie)
Filozofia, 72 (2017), 8, 593-602.
Abstract

The paradox of inference is based on the thesis that inferences cannot be both deductively valid and useful because an inference, in order to be useful, must advance us to a new conclusion, but a deductively valid inference cannot, on principle, do that, since its conclusions are contained in its premises. Falsification is a deductively valid inference as well.… Read more

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(Original title: The Fiction of Fictionalism)
Filozofia, 72 (2017), 8, 603-615.
Abstract

Fictionalism about fictional entities is an antirealist approach. It suggests that statements of literary criticism are to be understood in the same way as are fictional statements. The latter are naturally understood as being uttered in a pretend mode, i.e. not seriously. Fictionalism has it that the same holds for the former. It is sometimes argued that this is… Read more

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(Original title: Deduktívne a abduktívne retrodikcie a predikcie)
Filozofia, 72 (2017), 8, 616-631.
Abstract

Differentiating between formal positions condition and the conditioned (i.e. if-vector) as well as between the content’s exemplars (occuring in these positions, i.e. vector of relevance) and a direction of grammatical tenses (i.e. time vector) enables us to define two types of reasoning, based on the cause/effect relationship: deductive prediction and retrodiction… Read more

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(Original title: K metodologickému významu pojmu kultúry)
Filozofia, 72 (2017), 8, 632-644.
Abstract

The contribution deals with defining the phenomenon of culture and its concept from the perspectives of philosophy as well as special sciences. With regard to the philosophical approach to culture and the tension between particularism and universalism it focuses on culture/human nature relationship and the role these concepts play in social cognition. Due to… Read more

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(Original title: Priama percepcia, sociálna kognícia a interaktívny obrat)
Filozofia, 72 (2017), 8, 645-655.
Abstract

The paper aims to scrutinize the assumption of direct perception, which plays a crucial role in the interactive approach to social cognition. I try to show that the interactive approach is problematic, if we take into account the results of studies focused on the presence of mentalizing capacities in early infancy. I argue that direct perception does not provide a… Read more

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