Detail príspevku/publikácie

Abstrakt

The notion of substance in dialectical materialism is not enough explained and there are various opinions concerning its using. Some Marxist philosophers take substance for a notion that had been used in metaphysical materialism, but that loses its justification in dialectical materialism. Others think that it is a necessary component also in dialectical materialism. At a closer inquiry into the problem we find out that many an obscurity connected with this question arises because the ambivalence of the notion of substance is not respected. Spinoza's determination of substance as „what is in itself and what can be understood by help of itself“ and that „the substance is, as far as its naturalness is concerned, rather like its states“ shows us that it has two aspects. The monistic aspect and that one where the substance is understood as a primordial fundament of its states. If the first aspect, understood in the materialistic level, is compatible with dialectical materialism, then the other aspect is of metaphysical character and is inacceptable for dialectical materialism. When studying the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism we find out that the notion of substance in the metaphysical sense was refused by them. Instead of it they present the positive dialectical-materialistic conception of matter. They used the very notion of substance in more meanings, in most cases as an equivalent of other dialectical-materialistic notions. In the discussion about the significance or insignificance of the notion of substance in Marxist philosophy it is therefore necessary that the ambivalent meaning should be taken into consideration. The whole problem of substance in dialectical materialism can be solved only in close connection with the problem of the Marxist-Leninist notion of matter.