The goal of this paper is to provide answers for two key questions concerning epistemic intuitions in the context of skeptical arguments: (1) What is the nature of these intuitions? (2) Do they provide evidence or justification for the premises of these arguments? In contemporary literature on skepticism, the precise propositional contents of our „skeptical“ intuitions are rarely identified. I consider several possible ways of identifying them and conclude that our intuitive answers to various skeptical thought experiments are the best means of capturing the propositional content of our intuitions. This conclusion is based on the argument from philosophical usage of the terms „intuition“, „intuitive“ and the like. Moreover, I propose a theory of the origin of skeptical intuitions. I argue that these intuitions are products of our language competence. Further, I show that if this theory was true, it would not lend support to the idea that skeptical intuitions provide evidence or justification for the premises of skeptical arguments.