The problem of skepticism is one of the central problems in traditional epistemology which has its place also in contemporary analytically oriented epistemology. However, from the point of view of naturalized epistemology, skepticism is shifting to the periphery of interest. The subject of the paper is the relationship between skepticism and naturalism, which in contemporary epistemology are understood as opposing positions. Attention is focused on the critique of philosophical skepticism from the naturalistic perspective, as well as on the critique of the naturalistic reaction to skepticism from antinaturalist positions. The aim of the study is to clarify the main points of the dispute between the traditional approach and the naturalistic approach to knowledge inspired by Quine, with special regard to the problem of skepticism. The intention is to demonstrate that the dispute between traditional and naturalistic epistemology is not primarily concerned with skepticism, but it is a metaepistemological dispute concerning the nature or the very possibility and legitimacy of epistemology as a philosophical study in which the issue of epistemic normativity plays a central role.