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Deconstructing the Constituency of the Public Reason. Taking Systematic Conspiracy Theorists out of the Legitimation Pool

Filozofia, 75 (2020), 4, 263 – 278.
Typ článku: State

In the present article I argue that there is a class of conspiracy theorists that pose a threat to liberal democratic regimes, who tend to subscribe to potentially harmful conspiracy theories and can be regarded as unreasonable in two ways: i) do not accept the burdens of judgment; ii) are not motivated by a sense of justice. If we endorse political liberalism, we ought to partially exclude these citizens from the legitimation pool. The qualifier “partially” is important here, as I only endorse their exclusion qua bearers of an unreasonable conception. To the extent that they can employ other arguments, they will continue to be a part of the legitimation pool. Towards the end of the paper I investigate a potential counterargument to my position, which could be addressed by someone who postulates a Waldronian right to do wrong. I show that Quong’s distinction between a right to do wrong and a non-right to be unreasonable can be extended in this instance and thus invalidate this potential criticism.

Kľúčové slová

Burdens of judgment, Conspiracy theorists, Legitimation pool, Right to do wrong

Súbor na stiahnutie: PDF