The paper is an introduction to the analysis of Dennett’s philosophy of mind. The basis of Dennett’s explanatory model of consciousnes is examined, namely his criticism of Descartian noetic thesis, according to which a thinking person as res cogitans is not identical with the brain. Instead of that an ontological identity of concsiousness (mind) and brain is postulated by Dennett. The author maintains that Ryle’s and Dennett’s labeling Descartian conception of concsiousness as a „spirit in a machine“ dogma is unsustainable. In the second part conceiving Descartian metaphysics as dualistic is rejected. The author sees the counterposition of res cogitans and res extensa as an epistemic rather than an ontic one. She, therefore, takes approaching Cogito as a basic noetic starting point of the philosophical examination of consciousness for justified and reasonable.