Skip to main content

Publication Details

Rational Dialectics as a Method of Cognition

(Original title: Racionálna dialektika ako metóda poznania)
Filozofia, 31 (1976), 2, 158-172.
Type of work: Papers - Problems of Dialectics
Publication language: Slovak
Starting from The Theses on Feuerbach the author states that the Marxist dialectics is inseparable from the dialectically apprehended category of practice, and thus it is a contradiction to pragmatism that is based upon agnosticism as a world-outlook. The categorially apprehended process of practice is outlined as a function of the coherent system of the subjective and objective aspects of practice,, incorporating the independent objective being. The connection between consciousness and being, as Lenin defined it„ is in the substance of practice a decisive moment the knowledge of which leads to the formation of the system of dialectical categories and based upon them laws of dialectics. The system of categories is a theoretical awareness of practice upon which the theoretical definiteness of existence of independent objective being is based, of nature and a principal possibility of adequate knowledge. The coherence of consciousness and objective being in this conception rejects absolutization to which the notion of coherence was subdued in Hegel's account and led to idealism. The coherence is relative, fluent, comprehensive and thus it is lawfully connected with the contradictivenesis of consciousness and being, incorporating also the consciousness representing thus the dialectic matter. The dialectical coherence connected with contradictoriness facilitates then the causal dependence of the gnozeological contents of consciousness, the dependence that is a comprehensive relation of energy and thus also of the existence of knowledge as a reflexion. The categorial awareness of the substance of practice, connected with the awareness of logical laws as of dialectical way of thinking, does not represent discoursive thinking, but the specific logic of the object and disturbs thus also the naive realistic attitude in gnozeology that, with a bit amplified criticism, leads to agnostic standpoints. Practice thus becomes first of all an ontological criterion of verity upon which its function of the historical and, finally, of the experimental criterion is secondarily based. The theory of dialectical categories being not elaborated the secondary function of the criterion of practice is emphasized,, applicable only in indivisible connection with theoretical thinking. The author elaborates the aspects of this problem and also points out that the principle of induction lawfully depends upon the dialectical concrete analysis.
File to download: PDF