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Volume 74 (2019), 4

Articles

(Original title: Je Mill naozaj predchodca známeho vysvetlenia kontrafaktuálov?)
Filozofia, 74 (2019), 4, 259-277.
Abstract

In the discussion on counterfactuals Ramsey invoked Mill's opinion, when he defended the explanation that counterfactuals are elliptical deductive arguments. Similarly, Ramsey's followers did so. However, a more in-depth investigation reveals that Mill's view that conditionals (implications) express inferences is neither set within some theory of deduction, nor… Read more

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(Original title: The Descriptive and Normative Versions of Scientific Realism and Pessimism)
Filozofia, 74 (2019), 4, 278-290.
Abstract

Descriptive realism holds that T is true, while normative realism holds that T is warranted. Descriptive pessimism holds that T is false, while normative pessimism holds that T is unwarranted. We should distinguish between descriptive and normative realism because some arguments against scientific realism require that scientific realism be interpreted as… Read more

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(Original title: O metajazykovom odmietnutí zlomyseľného klamára)
Filozofia, 74 (2019), 4, 291-307.
Abstract

The main aim of the paper is to reconstruct Wittgenstein's criticism of the possibility of holding the skeptical position we traditionally call Cartesian doubt. According to Wittgenstein, the concept of this position is unintelligent because of the specific way language works. In any system of linguistic signs, there is a constitutive – unique – connection between… Read more

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(Original title: What does the Premise “a Deceiver Deceives me” Conclude? - Descartes’ Deceiver Argument Reconsidered)
Filozofia, 74 (2019), 4, 308-317.
Abstract

Descartes insists, “[...] there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me [...]” (AT-VII, 25; CSM-II, 17). In what way can we draw evidence that our existence can be drawn from our being deceived? The interpretations that the earlier studies have shown is… Read more

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(Original title: Patrí skúmanie ľudskej prirodzenosti medzi antropologické insolubilia?)
Filozofia, 74 (2019), 4, 318-333.
Abstract

Pojem „ľudská prirodzenosť“, problémy s jeho vymedzením v minulosti i súčasnosti filozofického myslenia i vo vedeckých iniciatívach predstavuje a utvára autorský zámer štúdie. Snahou autora je náčrt charakteristík uvedeného pojmu v širokom oblúku historicko-filozofického uvažovania prostredníctvom jeho vybraných reprezentantov. Jednou z ciest konštruovania… Read more

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Reflections

(Original title: Když je filosofie aktuální)
Filozofia, 74 (2019), 4, 334-342.
Abstract

Essay describes the various opportunities when to use the world timeliness. It understands topicality as an attribute that has arbitrary interpretation and is used with arbitrary meaning. He asks what factual reasons philosophy has if it is called actual. The main link is the devastation of the natural environment, which brings enormous and risky environmental… Read more

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Reviews

(Original title: ASSMANN, Jan: Achsenzeit. Eine Archeologie der Moderne)
Filozofia, 74 (2019), 4, 343-347.
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Obituary

(Original title: Za Ľubicou Hábovou)
Filozofia, 74 (2019), 4, 348.
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