Publication Details

Abstract

The ethos of a new beginning which was then promised by phenomenological philosophy was, with Husserl and Fink, in unity with speculative vigour of programmatic ideas. Nowadays these moments in phenomenological philosophy have split. Some phenomenologists try to elaborate also Husserl’s intuitivist method seriously and stubbornly, though sapiently. Others attempt to dazzle to the determinent of fair argumentation. The first part of the paper states that Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology represents an evolutionary interlink between Kant’s transcendental substantiation of knowledge and Heidegger’s intentional assumption of givenness. With Husserl, the objective contents are correlated to eidetic layers of subjective experience. Even though we are not able to experience that some mathematical propositions are evident, Husserl presupposes „possible“. The second part of the paper deals with rationalization of Husserl’s principle „evidence“ with E. Ströker. It points to ambivalence of Husserl’s conception of normativism of self-givenness in eidetic variations. In the third part, it is shown how Ströker thinks inner possibilities of phenomenological thought, only partially realized by Husserl himself, to the end and compares them with Husserl’s works. I tis a contrast to Ströker when M. Sommer reveals suggestively inner negativity of the evidence postulate.