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Abstract

The author in this paper proceeds from four stages of the development of scientific reasoning — classificatory, relative, causal, dialectical — and shows that especially when considering the last two explicatory methods we talk adequately about the concept of cause — effect and that of function in science. The author, at the same time, describes, on the whole, the relative reasoning as a metaphysical and isolational model of reality; the relative reasoning does not primarily reflect the influences and conections between the material objects (there are not methodologically realized these relations here) but things are interpreted from within. Thus the causal reasoning surmounts this relative ideal admitting the influence (in one direction) of a whole upon another one. In dialectic we speak, however, of the reciprocal influences between the real objects and, above that, of their mutual transformation. The new causal method was used also in the nineteenth century biology, especially in the works of Darwin who was compelled under the pressure of biological findings to classify animals causally. He dod not concieve them, therefore, as the static things but as historically developed formations that are in contact with environment (surroundings). And, thus under the influence of environment, here and there, their transformation takes place. The causal reasoning is, however, concerned only with the influence of the external factors upon the given whole, in this case an effect is said to be passive, therefore it does not affect the interaction of partial causes even when this is realized. Only the principal causes and not the secondary ones are the elements of the causal class, eo ipso the causal whole is at least partly closed. Still, we must distinguish the causal view from that of Darwin. As the former proceeds from the keystones of the world — as well as the relative view — and admits a (secondary) transformation (only) in the givenclass of things while the latter considers the mutability of principal qualities of reality (species) even when these transformations are materialized through onesided evolution. It is obvius that dialestic draws a more total picture of the world as there are evolutional processes linked with the development through leaps. This aspect of objective action has been, however, fully denied by Darwin. Hegel dealt with the concrete ways of the determination of wholes. Linked with that he made many statements e. g., of the sequence of causes and effects, the asymetry of the causal relation, the qualitative heterogeneity of influences and their consequences, and of the limitations of the causal relation that is dissolved in the dialectical conception of mutual influence. But he did not expanded the further laws of causality that has been formulated gradualy as the problems of individual scientific fields (the theory of relativity, the Quantum theory, cybernetcs) has been solved. But already Bacon instructed, in no-alchemist and -traditional way, upon the changing of conditions (in experiment) by which the inside of causal classes is affected. Along with the development of the causal views the concept of function comes forth that contemporary science uses in context with the concept of structure. In modern biology structure is often identified with organ, thing (in the narrow sense of the word). According to Darwin the character of function and of „structure“ is formed and materialized through process of the mutual relation between an organism and its environment. An organism, with the given organs, contacts its environment through the very functions of these entities. But in Darwin's thought function cannot be separated from structure, organ, therefore as the given organ is changed so its function is. In spite of this function is characterized by certain stability and purpose that is of significance in the adaptation, proctection, orientation, and in other reactions of an organism in the given environment. Function is a changeable aspect of an organ, thing by which it responds to the changing conditions of life. The lasting function sets the rhythm more in the environment in which an organism is „self-sufficient“, under the conditions that are not changing within relatively long periods. According to some authors the categories function and structure indicate the same. The significance of functions in the adaptation processe creates even an image of materialist character of the concept of teleology in sciences. In this paper analyzed problematic is incorectly solved in vitalism and holism that are based more upon function whilst the mechanistic orientated scientists praise the concept of structure. Yet even L. v. Bertalanfy has remarkably neglected the morphologic approach to the questions of biology. His general theory of systems is more a general theory of organization the valuable findings of which are related to the questions of structure.