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Publication Details

Explanatory Monism in Non-causal Explanations

(Original title: Explanační monismus u nekauzálních vysvětlení)
Filozofia, 77 (2022), 8, 590 - 607.
Type of work: Original Articles
Publication language: Czech

The paper investigates possible forms of explanatory monism for the cases of non-causal explanations (primarily Reutlinger 2018; Woodward 2018). In the conceptual analysis, the advantages and weaknesses of the counterfactual view of explanation are examined. Although this conception of explanation provides a common explanatory framework, it cannot sufficiently take into account the specificity of individual nomic generalizations and, in the non-causal case, it is difficult to construct a non-interventionist form of counterfactual. Therefore, the paper offers a return to the unificacionist view of explanation (primarily Kitcher 1981), which is a type of explanatory monism, does not suffer from the mentioned problems, and also offers a solution to the problem of asymmetry of non-causal explanations.


Non-causal explanation, Explanatory monism and pluralism, Counterfactual and unificationist views of explanation

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