In his contribution the author analyzes critically Kuhn’s refusal of continuity and truth of scientific cognition against the background of the controversy about the principle of correspondence. It is stated that the application of this principle has many limiting aspects and it cannot be, therefore, considered as a general proof of continuity of scientific cognition. Old theories are usually not preserved as a special case of a new theory, it is more adequate to speak of the preservation of individual constructive elements of the past knowledge. This has no hold on the fact that scientific cognition develops to be more truthful reflection of objective reality and the author, therefore, does not approve of Kuhn’s thesis that the development of science is plain and it does not aim at a more adequate ontology of objective reality. Thanks to the advancement of technology and practice of scientific experiment we get theories which disclose invariants proper to nature. In the end the author states that in spite of possible relativization of our knowledge by future development of science there will be no relativization of the legitimacy of materialist ontology and gnoseologic optimism.