Publication Details

Abstract

The author of the essay proves that though the German classic philosophy stemmed, on the one hand, from criticism of Kant’s philosophy, on the other hand it realised his endeavour of new metaphysics on a higher idealistic level. Fichte removed Kant’s thing-in-itself as an object allien to the subject and replaced it by the object that was essentially the subject, but in the form of its otherbeing. This is how in this philosophy the process of subjectivization of the object began, the process that was finally completed by Hegel. His object is essentially the subject comprising the categories, their dialectic development etc. — essentially on a qualitatively higher level all that exists in Kant’s subject. Thus although Hegel restored metaphysics which Kant wanted to abolish, he restored and completed it in Kantian intentions. Though Hegel’s absolute idealism is essentially subjective idealism, by having absorbed objective idealism and, as far as it could, materialism as well, it stood near materialism and let itself converse into it. This conversion was started by Feuerbach namely by disclosing Hegel’s world spirit as human spirit alienated from itself. The spirit disappeared from nature, only the matter remained. The work started by Feuerbach was continued by Marx, Engels and Lenin.