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Publication Details

Kant's Motif of Possible Experience and Phenomenological Philosophy

(Original title: Kantovský motiv možné zkušenosti a fenomenologické filozofie)
Filozofia, 45 (1990), 4, 369-386.
Type of work: Papers
Publication language: Czech

In contrast to the traditional alternative of Reason v. experience, Kant set up „possible experience“, heuristically productive postulation of unification of Reason and experience, mutual correction of Reason and imagination which does not mean constitution of objects. With Husserl the shift from Kant’s transcendental questioning towards internalization of objects of consciousness, to restriction of the regulative activity of consciousness to constitution of objects was introduced. In Husserl’s philosophy further unfolding of Kantian dimension of „possible experience“ is blocked by ontological precondition that the same logos which makes out the esence of the universe of objects is involved in the Reason of Man. E. Fink substitutes Kantian exposure of transcendental cognition by ontological source of object differentiation which consists in the formation of time horizons. Fink’s point of departure of seemingly destructive depresentation gives possibilities of more dynamic ontology of time than Heidegger’s circular facticity does. Lakatos’s concrete elaboration of the perspective that inner possibilities of development must serve a criterion of factual development applies fruitfully Kantian point of view of „possible experience“ to real historical movement.

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