

KANT'S REJECTION OF THE RIGHT OF REVOLUTION

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AZERI, S.: Kant's Rejection of the Right of Revolution
FILOZOFIA 64, 2009, No 6, p. 592

Kant's denial of right of revolution has bewildered many Kant's scholars. Kant sympathizes with French, American, and Irish revolutionaries. But in his *Metaphysics of Morals* he rejects the right of revolution. Apparently, his stance represents a tension or a contradiction. Kant believes that a legitimate government should be based on the consent of the citizens. Thus, logically he is expected to affirm the right of citizens to disobedience. However, he also holds the view that citizens' moral obligation to obey the law is absolute. I believe that Kant's rejection of the right of revolution does not represent a contradiction. Rather, it is the necessary consequence of Kant's metaphysics of subject and the notion of transcendental subjectivity.

Keywords: Revolution – Right – State – Transcendental subject – Empirical self – Noumena – Phenomena

Kant's denial of right of revolution has bewildered many Kant scholars.¹ Kant sympathizes with French, American, and Irish revolutionaries. Yet in several places he openly rejects the right of revolution. His stance apparently represents a tension or a contradiction.

The relation between the transcendental consciousness as the principle of the unity of the experience and the realm of experience – the nature – is important in order to comprehend Kant's view. According to Kant's Copernican Revolution the laws of nature are not found in nature as the empiricists propose; man, as the manifestation of transcendental subject, does not acquire these laws via pure experience. Rather, he dictates such laws into the nature. It is not reason that follows the path of nature; on the contrary, it is nature that conveys to rules and laws that are put by transcendental reason. The apparent contradictory essence of such a formula can be resolved only with appeal to a dual notion of subjectivity. To the extent that subjectivity signifies the empirical self it is part of the nature; whereas, the subjectivity that dictates laws upon nature – and therefore upon the empirical self – represents the transcendental subject.

The same dual approach is required when Kant considers politics.² Kant's notion of natu-

¹ Among many, in my opinion, Reiss (1956), Beck (1971/1978), Axinn (1971), Nicholson (1976), Grcic (1986), Hill (2002), and Ellis (2005) are the most inspiring accounts of Kant's attitude towards the right of revolution and its relation to his moral theory.

² Ignoring the distinction between the transcendental subject and the empirical self results into mistaken reformulations of the assumed tension in Kant's account of the right of revolution. Reiss, for instance, refers to the idea of independence of the individual in face of the authority and goes on to ask how, then, was it possible that Kant "explicitly denied any individual the right to rebel against established authority" (1956, 179). These formulations fail to see that the independent individual in the civil constitution that Kant has in mind, is the *citizen*, and not the individual, natural *man* as a member of the human species. Sidney Axinn similarly ignores this distinction and concludes that Kant is a pessimist regarding the individual and an optimist with regard to human race (1971, 427-8). However, if this

ral law clearly is based upon the Keplerian-Newtonian models and conceptions of universal, natural laws. According to Newtonian framework, the principle that makes the actualization of motion and mechanical laws in the world of phenomena possible is the absolute laws that determine the world of things-in-themselves. For instance, the product of the interacting forces in the noumenal sphere is equal to zero, so is the resultant velocity. Newton differentiates the phenomena from what he postulates as reality. He distinguishes *absolute magnitudes* from *sensible measures*. The former is available to reason, whereas, the latter is accessible via experiential measurement. As Van Fraassen states:

In the mathematical model provided by Newton's theory, bodies are located in absolute Space, in which they have real or absolute motions. But within these models we can define structures that are meant to be exact reflections of those appearances, and are, as Newton says, identifiable as differences between true motions. (1980, 45)

Kant's differentiation between the noumena and phenomena is clearly Newtonian. What is Kant's philosophical contribution to this differentiation is introducing the transcendental subject as the principle of the unity of the experience. To the extent that the subject designates the empirical self it is a part of the world of phenomena. Moreover, as a phenomenon, it is subject to the laws that are determined by transcendental subject. How the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal worlds can be generalized into the realm of the subject? Kant does not explicitly present transcendental subject in contrast to the empirical self, but he does speak about such distinction in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.³

Although there is no one-to-one relation between the distinction of the noumena and phenomena, on the one side, and the distinction between the transcendental subject and the empirical self, on the other side, a model that depicts the latter and which is in harmony with the former can be presented. When practical philosophy is at stake a threefold model can be provided. At the most basic level there is the transcendental subject as a general form, which makes the unity of the world of experience, including the existence of the self, possible. Transcendental subject is not determined by universal laws, but is the principle that provides the possibility of their existence. In phenomenal world we encounter the natural man and laws of his actions as phenomena. The natural man is a form of object that is subject to the mechanical laws of nature where the actuality of these laws depends on the absolute laws of the noumenal world.

Natural man, according to Kant, is neither the transcendental subject nor the empirical self. Rather, it is a phenomenon that is related to the transcendental self in an essential but undetermined way through external mechanical laws. Realization of subject is possible only if

distinction is looked upon then it becomes clear that the constitution of the state is the condition of the realization of freedom, equality, and independence of the individual citizen, whereas lack or removal of the state results in dissolution of these rational principles. Kant's rejection of right of revolution follows necessarily from these principles on the basis of such a distinction.

³ Kant insists that the transcendental unity of apperception is in possession of the representations of the "I." These representations should belong to *one* self-consciousness if there is to be not a "many-colored and diverse self" (Kant 1787/1929, B 134). Also David Carr addresses this aspect of Kant's consideration of subject: "knowledge requires an a priori subjective unity, that is, one 'I' to which the many representations belong" (1999, 41). Quassim Cassam, too, addresses the dual nature of Kantian conception of subject and introduces the transcendental (impersonal) subject as the principle that unites successive and diverse experiences in one consciousness: "the subject must be capable of ascribing these experiences to himself as *his* experiences; and the subject must be aware, or potentially aware, of the numerical identity of that to which the different experiences are ascribed (1989, 77-8).

laws that are rooted in the transcendental subject regulate the relation between members of human species. Constitution and actualization of civil society and the state forms and realizes this lawfulness. By entering the civil society and being legally organized the natural man turns into the citizen. The citizen is subject to external laws that function independent of the individual as a member of human species. It is only after the actualization of civil society and promotion of natural man to citizen that the moral subject becomes realizable. Kant's Moral subject, who is expected to act so that the maxim of his action becomes a universal law, is not the natural man but is the citizen as the representation of the transcendental subject.

The laws of nature are realizable only on the basis of absolute noumenal laws. The laws that determine the constitution of civil society are also based upon these absolute laws. Practical philosophy, which consists of the science of Right and the science of ethics, "forms a counterpart to the 'Metaphysical Principles of the Science of Nature'" (Kant 1769, 3). Therefore, the citizen acquires the possibility to act in concordance with the transcendental law. Consequently, Kant's moral subject can make the maxim of its action a universal law or imperative only if it acts in accordance with the transcendental universal moral law. The exemplary moral action, thus, cannot contradict the right and the law as the representations of transcendental Right. A moral action that opposes the law of civil constitution and the state contradicts the transcendental law and transcendental subject as the principle of the unity of the experience.

History, which is the disclosure of social capacities that are implemented by nature in man, in Kant's view is subject to a set of laws that are similar to universal natural laws. It is the nature that did "bring forth a Kepler who, in an unexpected way, reduced the eccentric paths of planets to definite laws; and then she brought forth a Newton, who explained those laws by a universal natural Cause" (Kant 1970, 42). A similar problem that humans face in society is the constitution of a perfect civil society that regulates the external relations between states conformably to Law. Viewed in this way, the whole social history is conceived as the realization of a hidden perfect plan of nature (Kant 1970, 45-6).

However, in conformity to transcendental rules that were laid in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, these laws and plans, as plans and laws inherent in nature, should ultimately be posed upon nature by the transcendental subject. When Kant considers "the natural principle of the political order" he in fact evaluates those political principles at work, which are put forward by the transcendental subject of the political realm, that establish the political orderliness of civil society. In other words, the natural principle of the political order signifies the transcendental essence of the political Right. Kant states: "the will's manifestations in the world of phenomena, i.e., human actions, are determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event" (1970, 41).

Hence, the dilemma of Kant's approach to revolution can be reformulated: In accordance with the imperative, act so that the maxim of your action becomes a universal law, it may be concluded that it is inevitable for Kant to approve the right of revolution. Formally speaking, if revolution actualizes the restoration of the rule of the law then it is acceptable. However, revolution aims the very bases of the law and therefore, it should be necessarily disapproved and the right to revolt has to be rejected. Revolution is an empirical act that is conducted in phenomenal realm. The subjects of the revolution are the empirical selves, whom Kant identifies with citizens. These subjects signify the experientially existing persons. Revolution aims the basis of the existence of moral subject and the citizen, i.e., it aims the transcendental subject. Therefore, it cannot be made into a universal, moral imperative, because in such a case human is pushed back to his natural situation and will lose the possibility of realizing his subjectivity. Kant himself formulates this dilemma as the resolution of the question of the priority of formal principles over material principles of action when the problem of the pure practical reason is at

stake (1970, 121-2).

On the other hand, the subject of the action who is expected to act in a way that the maxim of his action becomes a universal imperative is not the empirical self as the member of species but is the representation of the transcendental subject. In other words, it is only the transcendental subject – and the citizen as the representation of this transcendental subject that distances himself from the man in the state of nature – that is capable of proposing and constituting the law. The empirical self should abide and conform to the law of the transcendental. In the *Question of Enlightenment* Kant claims that as far as the individual is concerned only a few succeed in freeing themselves from immaturity and become free agents (1970, 54-5). However, he continues, the chances of public enlightenment – in contradistinction to individual enlightenment – are higher (55). This is in line with Kant's view that contrasts the progress of the human species with individual's retreat. Kant considers revolutionary action propagating the yoke of prejudices and immaturity because progress and change toward maturity or enlightenment comes slowly (reformism). Kant claims that unless all members of the species acquire their share from "maturity" and "enlightenment" and become enlightened we cannot speak of enlightenment and maturity and freedom of humans. "For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is *freedom*" (1970, 55). And freedom is the liberty to use one's reason and thus to "argue"; i.e., the ideal enlightened action is rational criticism while obeying the law (Kant 1970, 55).

Acting *to form* an imperative should be interpreted as acting *in accordance to* the moral law that is rooted in transcendental Right. Kant's moral – and therefore free – subject acts ethically only if he follows the transcendental order. When it comes to choosing between the material and theoretical principles as the basis of righteous political action the latter should be chosen because only the principles of pure practical reason can provide the necessary principles of rightful action: "as a principle of right, it [the aforementioned maxim] has absolute necessity, whereas the former [material principles of action] is necessary only if the empirical conditions which permit the proposed end to be realized can be assumed to exist" (1970, 122). This maxim is the formal principle of morality and postulates the end of political action based on the concept of duty.

Kant's evaluation of political history is based on a particular conceptualization of man, which is rooted in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. He states, "men neither pursue their aims purely by instinct, as the animals do, nor act in accordance with an integral, prearranged plan like rational cosmopolitans" (Kant 1970, 41). Such an approach presumes man having a bifurcated nature that consists of empirical (bodily) and rational (transcendental) elements. This is a sym-metric image of the assumed duality between the natural man and the citizen.

The universal order of nature, according to Kant, is teleological in essence; in other words, every element in history serves to fulfill *the* end. What is this "end"? The lawful orderliness of nature follows from this teleological making. Reason is applicable only if there is law, which means that it is applicable only if there is a teleological order. Kant states, "those natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his [human] reason are such that they could be fully developed only in the species but not in the individual" (1970, 42). The 'species' is the representation of the transcendental essence of man in phenomenal realm. The appeal to this transcendentality is caused by natural finitude of human individual. The essence of this transcendentality, which is explained through the language of natural political law, is the pure reason:

Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct

and by his own reason. (1970, 43)

The law of social order – the contract – follows from man’s natural situation where he contradicts the benefits of other men. Kant calls this natural stage the unsocial sociability of man (1970, 44). Kant’s account of the constitution of the social contract stems from Hobbesian premise of the “war of all against all”. In the “Perpetual Peace” Kant clearly expresses this Hobbesian view, which also confirms the interpretation that in his view human has a bifurcated nature: “A state of peace among men living together is not the same as the state of nature, which is rather a state of war” (1970, 98). Moreover, Kant’s “individual” is not a socially determined conscious phenomenon but is simply the member of the species. Such conceptualization of the individual is the necessary consequence of Kant’s naturalism. According to this naturalism man owns a specific, unalterable essence. Man is essentially selfish, anti-social, individualist, and immoral. He only pursues his personal benefit. However, with the rule of reason man transcends this natural crudeness and puts these negativities in the service of the general amenity of the species.

In the “Fifth Proposition” of the *Universal History* Kant answers the aforementioned question about the “end”. Kant calls the formation of the civil society in concordance with the universal Law the greatest practical problem of the human race. Due to the bifurcated essence of human being there are antagonistic elements at work – human’s natural selfishness and man’s rational capability to pursue the benefit of the species. Therefore, the formation of the civil society requires the disappearance of this bifurcation. “The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in which *freedom under external laws* would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly *just civil constitution*” (1970, 45-6). Kant clarifies the nature of the bifurcation of human essence when he states that “man is *an animal who needs a master*” (1970, 46). Where are we to find this master? He responds: “Nowhere else but in human species” (1970, 46). The master, whom is to be found *in* the species, does not signify the individual person. Rather, it designates the representation of the transcendental subject as the source of the transcendental law of the reason. The ruler, the administrator, thus, is the embodiment of this transcendental law. Hence, Kant states: “Yet the highest authority has to be just *in itself* and yet also a *man*” (1970, 46). Justice in itself can be acquired only in the noumenal realm, and it is accessible only to the pure reason – in this case to the pure political reason – that denotes the noumenal self.

The determination of the constitution of history by transcendental subject becomes clearer when Kant argues the a priori character of the lawful orderliness of the history and contrasts “philosophical history” to actual history that consists of the empirical making of the events:

It would be a misinterpretation of my intention to contend that I meant this idea of a universal history, which to some extent follows from an *a priori* rule, to supersede the task of history proper, that of *empirical* composition. My idea is only a notion of what a philosophical mind, well acquainted with history, might be able to attempt from a different angle. (1970, 53)

Without such philosophical understanding history will be mere historiography that amounts to an arbitrary accumulation of the events. The main idea that is inherent in contrasting the philosophical and the empirical histories is that the Right, including moral, ethical and political laws, belongs to that subject who also owns the pure reason.

In Kant’s view, civil society is different from all other forms of contract *not* due to its ends but because of its principles. The distinguishing aspect of civil society is that it is an end

in itself and will give way to the establishment of commonwealth.⁴ The civil constitution of society is presented framed within a particular form of state. The state or the commonwealth is the realization of the rights of man that are secured against the encroachments of others. In this sense, the form of realization of rights of men is “external”.

The aforementioned idea of externality of rights is based upon the idea of essential individuality of the form of human existence and, in turn, reproduces this idea. Kant addresses this peculiarity of human existence as the phenomenon of “self-dependence” or independence. In such a case the only possible relation among men is the mechanical arrangements that regulate the relations among externally posited, isolated atoms. These external regulations always have to be transcendental. Otherwise, they lose the ground of being applicable to the entirety of these monad-like individuals.

Kant refers to these regulating laws as limitation of freedom of individuals to which every person subjects himself complying with the authority of the pure reason:

Since every restriction of freedom through the arbitrary will of another party is termed *coercion*, it follows that a civil constitution is a relationship among *free* men who are subject to coercive laws, while they retain their freedom within the general union with their fellows. Such is the requirement of pure reason, which legislates *a priori* regardless of all empirical ends (which can all be summed up under the general heading of happiness). (Kant 1970, 73)

In the first addendum to the “Perpetual Peace” Kant explains the relation between morality and politics and makes the aforementioned distinction between material and theoretical principles clearer. The principles of politics are dictated to men by nature. However, the imposition of political principles does not mean the determination of the duty of human by nature. Rather, it signifies the realization of a constitution that teleologically exists in nature. The imposition of duty is realizable only by pure practical reason that acts “without any external constraints” (Kant 1970, 112). Nature functions in favor of man, to comport him out of the state of nature, only practically, since man is incapable in this realm (1970, 112).

Moreover, Kant clearly states that the constitution of state does not occur from the principles of morality. Principles of morality are basically the imperatives that conduct the individual moral actions and are put forward by the pure practical reason. These imperatives are assumed to regulate the actions of the individual in relation to the transcendentalism of the individual. The actions of the individual person within a constituted state, on the other hand, are regulated by the transcendental will, which is the expression of the Right in the form of law.

The pure, law-giving reason to which Kant refers is the pure reason that belongs to the transcendental subject. The “natural” universal laws that determine the society, like other natural laws, are defined and dictated upon their subjects by the transcendental subject as the unify-

⁴ Elisabeth Ellis intends to resolve the tension between the ethical duty of the moral agent and the political duty of the citizen with reference to an empirical notion of the *will* that is derived from some external *end*. This tension is the reflection of the aforementioned conflict between citizen’s duty of absolute obedience to authority, and the moral imperative, which requires the person to act in a way that his maxim of action becomes a universal law. Ellis mistakenly presents the “end”, or “the highest good”, as an empirical element and then reduces the *will* to the expression of the united will of empirical persons. Whereas, the end, in Kant’s view, is the *telos* of the history, it is civil society in a priori and teleological sense. It cannot be an empirical or provisional target. If “end” is considered an empirical or provisional element that helps “people to live together while respecting each other’s autonomy” (2005, 143) then its actualization is left to the mercy of empirical selves, which means it is not a priori and normative. Moreover, the will, in Kant’s view, is the transcendental will as the representation of the Right in form of the law.

ing principle that also provides the unity of the experience. In accordance with this transcendental subjectivism, thus, the particular form of actualization of transcendental laws that regulate the externally established relation among human individuals, that is, the particular form of the constitution of civil society, is necessarily monarchy. The monarch, therefore, is the embodiment of transcendental Right that is posited external to other subjects and makes the universal application of laws of society possible. The monarch is the master that is transcendently external and yet exists within the human race.

Monarchy, according to Kant, in contrast to democracy, is farthest from despotism (1970, 101-2). Democracy, meaning the rule of the people by the people, does not realize the rational law of division of powers.⁵ In a democracy, by definition, the executive and the legislative powers are actualized by the same subject, namely the people. Democracy, in its literal sense, cannot assume a representative form. Apparently, Kant's model of representation is yet another reflection of his idea about the severance of pure reason and praxis; i.e., Kant's insistence about the favorability of a representative republican form of government reflects his idea that distinguishes the transcendental subject from the empirical self. Only a representative form of government can guarantee the regulative and external presence of the transcendental will. That which determines the form of government is the "act of general will" (1970, 101) by which a number of men are constituted as a people. The "general will" is not a reflection of an achieved general consent among citizens but is the representation of transcendental will. This act of will is external to all individual men that are constituted by this universal will as people; it is the transcendental principle of the constitution of the people. Therefore, a form of government that is not representative "is essentially an *anomaly*" (Kant 1970, 101) because it lacks the external, constitutive transcendental will:

We can therefore say that the smaller the number of ruling persons in a state and the greater their powers of representation, the more the constitution will approximate to its republican potentiality, which it may hope to realize eventually by gradual reforms. For this reason, it is more difficult in an aristocracy than in a monarchy to reach this one and only perfectly lawful kind of constitution, while it is possible in democracy only by means of violent revolution. (1970, 101)

Kant enumerates three rational principles of the civil state as liberty, equality, and independence. Liberty is the acceptance of the external limitations upon the individual freedoms that are inherited from the natural state of man for the sake of the formation of the commonwealth. Equality, however, is a totally formal regulation that is determined with respect to the formality of the transcendental law. Equality is the admission of the fact that individuals are subject to the coercions of Law. Although formally equal, therefore, one can be subject to the will of another. This aspect is explicitly clear when the assumed form of state is monarchy,

⁵ Kant distinguishes "form of sovereignty" and "form of government" as "forms of state". The former can be autocratic, aristocratic, and democratic. The latter is either republican or despotic. Kant, not only does not argue against the compatibility of republicanism and aristocracy, but also devalues democracy as farthest *form of sovereignty* from the republican *form of government*. Joseph Grcic ignores this distinction and incorrectly identifies republicanism with democracy as the expression of the united will of the people (1986, 449). His whole argument about the alleged inconsistency in Kant's rejection of the right of revolution is based on the assumption that since in Kant's republican state "the legislative power is sovereign and belongs to the will of the people" then Kant should not hold the view that obeying the law is absolute (450). However, the aforementioned distinction leaves Grcic's inference baseless. Sidney Axinn also ignores the distinction between the forms of sovereignty and forms of government and mistakenly attributes a contrast between monarchy and republicanism to Kant (1971, 426).

since to be the subject to the law will then mean being subject to the will of the monarch. Moreover, Kant sees no contradiction between the empirical determination of one subject by the will of another and the formal equality of all subjects before the Law. He states:

This uniform equality of human beings as subjects of a state is, however, perfectly consistent with the utmost inequality of the mass in the degree of its possessions, whether these take the form of physical or mental superiority over others, or of fortuitous external property and of particular rights (of which there may be many) with respect to others. Thus the welfare of the one depends very much on the will of the other... Nevertheless, they are all equal as subjects *before the law* ... as the pronouncement of the general will. (1970, 75)

Kant introduces independence as the condition of the realization of liberty and equality (1970, 77). This is to say that the monadic individual or the citizen – as the representation of the transcendental subject – is the basis of the constitution of the civil society. In Kant's view the independence of the transcendental subject is realizable only in the person of the monarch who is the actualization of the law that constitutes the civil society. Kant states that it is only himself that the individual does not harm. The individual, in the meantime, is introduced as the master of his own (*sui juris*). However, since the independent individual is the principle of the realization of liberty and equality it is identifiable with the actuality of the civil society which is the realization of civil contract. The constitution of the civil contract acquires its actuality in the state and therefore in the person of the monarch. Hence, the fulfillment of the idea of independence of citizens is possible truly within monarch as the representation of the transcendental subject. The head of the state is the representation or the embodiment of the pure transcendental subject. For instance, if there is a conflict between the interests of citizens and the monarch, since there is no other authority than monarch by referring to whom the conflict is to be decided, the conflict should be dismissed (Kant 1970, 81-2). Consequently, the only desirable form of administration is monarchy.

Principles of politics relate and regulate a particular group of empirically existing persons externally in order to make them into a people. These principles can be considered the universal mechanical laws of the realm of civil constitution. "Naturalness" of these principles does not indicate their non-transcendentality. Rather it signifies their externality in relation to their objects. In other words, through these principles the natural individual is promoted to the level of a citizen. If the citizen conforms to political principles, then he will be able to act in concordance with the principles of morality that are dictated by pure practical reason. In this way, the apparent contradiction between the political and moral action disappears. It is the political principles that make the realization of moral principles possible and not vice-versa.⁶ Therefore,

⁶ Ellis bases her argument about Kant's pragmatic political view upon the supposition that Kant's political principles are *derived* from ethical imperatives. Thus she refers to his statement in *Rechtslehre* about the resistance of political matters against a full theoretical analysis: "Kant is not satisfied merely to sketch the outlines of the ideal political realm that follows from a priori ethical principles" (2005, 114). However, the relation between political and ethical is reverse; it is not the political that follows from the ethical; on the contrary, the ethical is possible only if the political realm that produces the citizen as the subject of ethical activity is constituted. Thus, the political principles are required not as derivatives of a more general ethical theory but as the basis for the realization of ethical principles. Moreover, Kant in the preface of *Rechtslehre* does not exactly maintain what Ellis attributes to him, that is, "political life resists purely ideal analysis" (114). Kant states that although the principles of right, as principles derived from a purely rational science, are rooted in pure reason, yet they are applicable to empirical cases. Such applicability is necessary if the desired completeness of a pure theoretical science is to be achieved, because "completeness and comprehensiveness are essential and indispensable to the formation of

the latter does not – and as far as the right to revolt is concerned cannot – contradict the former. Hence, the moral imperatives do not form a basis upon which the right of revolt or rebellion emerges. Principles of morality are based in the realm of pure practical reason and belong to the transcendental subject. Therefore, as far as their individual application is concerned they presume the existence of the *citizen*, which in turn presupposes the existence of civil society and lawful order.⁷ As Kant states:

[I]n their [citizens'] external relations, they have already approached what the idea of right prescribes, although the reason for this is certainly not their internal moral attitudes. In the same way, we can expect their moral attitudes to reproduce a good political constitution; on the contrary, it is only through the latter that the people can be expected to attain a good level of moral culture. (1970, 113)

Thus, the right of revolution should be ruled out. Such a right has no theoretical-transcendental justification. Revolutionary action attacks the fundamentals of the transcendental law; it is therefore irrational and destroys the basis of morality; consequently it annihilates freedom. In this sense, it is self-deficient. Thus, it should be rejected.

The idea of social contract, according to Kant, belongs to reason; i.e., civil state is constituted in the realm of transcendental. The transcendental essence of the idea of civil society further becomes manifest when Kant indicates the impossibility of achieving a full consent concerning the law within empirical realm among citizens.⁸ Thus, the relation of the empirically existing citizen to the law is that of duty more than consent. Kant maintains that “if it is at least *possible* that a people could agree to it [a law], it is our duty to consider the law as just, even if the people is at present in such a position or attitude of mind that it would probably refuse its consent if it were consulted” (1970, 79) Thus, the right to revolt should necessarily be rejected. If such a “right” is accepted, then the determination of the transcendental by the empirical is intrinsically confirmed:

Thus if a people, under some existing legislation, were asked to make a judgment which in all probability would prejudice its happiness, what should it do? Should the people not oppose the measure? The only possible answer is that they can do nothing but obey. For we are

a rational system” (Kant 1887, 4).

⁷ Thomas Hill argues against identification of the illegal and immoral in Kant’s political philosophy. He claims that Kant’s basic moral principles might support a position that approves revolution (2002, 294). This argument, however, fails to distinguish between man as is considered in his state of nature and man as the citizen. The quotation above, from Kant’s text, openly describes this position that Hill ignores.

⁸ Grcic, too, emphasizes the rational-formal nature of the contract. He states that: “The contract is a formal principle for the evaluation of the justice and lawfulness of the public constitution which has specific material components” (1986, 448). Yet, his ignoring the distinction between subject of the principle of social contract—that the contract belongs to the realm of transcendental subject—and the empirically existing individual prevents him from acquiring the significance of this formality. Grcic also ignores that Kant defines motives of the will not as “objects of physical feelings” but as “absolute law” (Kant 1970, 68). Grcic, thus, concludes that Kant’s “autonomy of will” is incompatible with his demand for absolute obedience towards the state and that Kant’s demand is justified via a utilitarian argument. He fails to see that for Kant the subject’s absolute duty towards the state follows from state’s being the embodiment of the absolute law. Moreover, he holds to the same mistaken view as Garve and others, that Kant criticizes in *Theory and Practice*, asserting that the moral duty and the actual deed are irreconcilable due to the moral impurity of human nature (Kant 1970, 69).

not concerned here with any happiness which the subject may expect to derive from the institutions or administration of the commonwealth, but primarily with the rights which would thereby be secured for everyone. (1970, 80)

Man as such and his idea of happiness belongs to the empirical realm. Thus, happiness cannot be referred to “as a principle of legislation”. Principle of happiness signifies the experientiality of the empirical self in its relation to the law. Any action in its name violates the determination of the right of reason which is the law that is dictated by the transcendental subject (Kant 1970, 83). Whereas, men or people *must* live in commonwealth, which is to say that they have to live under the rule of the law that is practically imposed by the state. Every man has the duty to conform to the law of the state as a transcendental, extra-historical end in itself. Thus, it is conformity to the transcendental right and not the consent of common citizens who are subjects to the rule of the state that legitimizes the law. Therefore, the consent is reasonable only if it is in concordance with the concept of transcendental right:

For so long as it is not self-contradictory to say that an entire people could agree to such a law, however painful it might seem, the law is in harmony with right. But if a public law is beyond reproach (i.e. *irreprehensible*) with respect to right, it carries with it the authority to coerce those to whom it applies, and conversely, it forbids them to resist the will of the legislator by violent means. (1970, 80-1)

If the consent and the law conflict the empirically formed consent of the citizens should be coerced and outlawed.

It thus follows that all resistance against the supreme legislative power, all incitement of the subjects to violent expressions of discontent, all defiance which breaks out into rebellion is the greatest and most punishable crime in the commonwealth, for it destroys its very foundations. (Kant 1970, 81)

In the Appendix to “Perpetual Peace” Kant explains the relation between political philosophy and moral philosophy more clearly. He maintains that the former cannot contradict the latter and the difference between the two is due to the nature of their objects: Moral principle is the *theoretical* science of right whereas politics deals with its *practice*. Moral philosophy is the science of the pure practical reason. Yet, if the path that is shown by pure reason is followed, the final end of political principle will be clearly visible and the fact that politics and morals are not contradictory becomes evident (Kant 1970, 116). Kant further distinguishes between ethics as the practical science of Rights and morality as the pure theoretical science of Right. He clearly states that politics should follow the principles of morality as a pure science (Kant 1970, 129).

Once made, the law should be obeyed and cannot be violated or rejected.⁹ Kant states, “the people, under an existing civil constitution, has no longer any right to judge how the constitution should be administered” (Kant 1970, 81). The assumed right to revolt is an act against the constitution upon which every particular law is based (Kant 1970, 84). Kant clearly maintains that the law is and has to be based upon the principles of pure reason and that, in contrast to the lawful universality of the right, revolution, as an empirical act, should be rejected. Kant states that the political right should be “based on *a priori* principles, for experience cannot provide knowledge of what is right, and there is a *theory* of political right to which practice must conform before it can be valid” (1970, 86).

The idea of inalterability of the right and of the state is also maintained in the “Perpetual

⁹ Axinn emphasizes this aspect of Kant’s consideration of the state as a form of “Victorianism” (1971, 429).

Peace”. Although Kant does not address the question of revolution directly his suggestion concerning right of states to exist and not being dissolved into greater states, taken in its particular historical context, makes his rejection of the right to revolt more conceivable. According to Kant, the state is not a thing, neither a property, nor a patrimony (1970, 94). The state is an end in itself and it owns natural rules. Therefore the limits of the existing states should be left intact. Hence, in the fifth proposition about the perpetual peace Kant states, “no state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another state” (1970, 96). Ascription of a “natural” essence to state, on the other hand, results in personification of the state. This, in turn, supports the idea that for Kant monarchy is the most favorable and the “natural” form of administration.

Kant introduces force as an indispensable element of civil constitution that is the result of the implications of practicality of politics. A moral politician, according to Kant, is the one that in case that some inadequacies appear in the law is ready to introduce reforms into it towards attainment of the ideal political end. Kant explains political inadequacies as practical problems that are caused by *application of the law*; these shortcomings, theoretically speaking, have no roots in the concept of Right. The gradual reform policy that Kant suggests is also a practical means in order to avoid the evils that may be caused by violent revolution of people. To the extent that Kant deals exclusively with the practicality of political realm he admits the factuality of revolution.¹⁰ He even maintains that in case that the violent revolution of people that is rooted in discrepancies of the older constitution becomes successful and brings along a constitution that is closer to the idea of Right no attempt should be made to restore the old regime or to punish the participants in the revolution (Kant 1970, 118).

Kant does not consider revolution a right but a mere empirical fact. So, the tension between Kant’s sympathetic stance regarding French revolution and his clear rejection of the right to revolt is resolved. French revolution was successful as a *matter of fact*.¹¹ Moreover, the laws of the older regime were not Righteous, whereas the post-revolutionary constitution, at least in theory, aimed towards constitution of the civil society in concordance with the idea of Right.

¹⁰ Axinn formulates the factual desirability of the revolution as follows: “If there is no civil society, then there is no civil law and we may use violence to establish it” (1971, 426). Contradiction between the government and the law is a form of *contradictio in adjectio*. From a contradiction everything follows, even a revolution. Thus, one may conclude that while Kant does not assume the right of revolution, which means that he does theoretically approve the revolution, he has an analytical phenomenology of revolutions.

¹¹ Thomas Hill formulates the tension between Kant’s moral principles and matter-of-factness of revolution as the tension between what is morally “permissible” and what is morally “desirable”. According to Hill this tension, in turn, is the reflection of a more fundamental one between the inalterability of the Right and historical progress (2002, 284). He argues that Kant, based upon such distinction, not only may approve revolutions *ipso facto* but also has a theory that permits revolutions. Peter Nicholson (1976), too, holds a similar view when considering the tension between inevitability of progress and stability of the state, where the latter might block the way of the former. He claims that the question of the inevitability of the progress stays unresolved in Kant’s political philosophy. However, the idea of stability of the Right (and of the state) and historical progress are not mutually exclusive in Kant’s view. To the contrary, the factual, historical progress, for Kant, is an approximation to the idea of Right that belongs to Reason. Historical progress is meaningful to the extent that it actualizes the teleological plan of the Reason that functions as the political natural law. Thus, the idea of a Kantian theoretical justification for the right of revolution seems implausible. Yet, factually speaking, if a revolution *succeeds* in constituting a state that approximates the idea of rational Right it can be approved.

The realm of law acquires its unity by the unity of transcendental consciousness. Even in its empirical dimension, the social unity of law depends on the unity of the transcendental subject. Revolutionary action, in an unjustifiable way, reverses the relation between the transcendental subject – as the principle of the unity of the experience – and the experience. It intends to determine the transcendental via the empirical. This is rationally and morally unfounded and thus, the right to such an action should be rejected. Nevertheless, the unity of the self as an element of the unity of the experiential realm also depends on the unity of the transcendental subject. Therefore, an empirical act, which contradicts the transcendental subject, amounts to annihilation of the very empirical self, since in such a case the empirical self loses its basis of being.

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* A shorter version of this paper was formerly presented at the Iranian Research Institute of Philosophy on February 28, 2007. I should thank Dr. Shapour Etemad and Dr. Mehdi Nasrin from the Iranian Research Institute of Philosophy and Ms. Arezoo Islami for inspiring and constructive suggestions and criticism. Another version of this paper was presented at the Second International Conference on Philosophy organized by Athens Institute for Education and Research on June 4-5, 2007, and has been published *An Anthology of Philosophical Studies* (ATINER, Athens, Greece, 2008), pp. 65-76.

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LESZEK DRONG:

Disciplining the New Pragmatism. Theory, Rhetoric, and the Ends of Literary Study (Formovanie nového pragmatizmu. Teória, rétorika a ciele literárnych štúdií)

Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH 2007, 244 pp. ISBN-10:3-631-55935-6

V súčasnej literárnej teórii, ktorá čerpá z tradície neopragmatizmu, vstupuje do epicentra pozornosti problematika významu textu a intencionality autora/čitateľa, a formuje tak priestor na inšpiratívne prieniky filozofie a literárno-kultúrnej teórie. V tomto priestore staronových horizontov nachádzali už skôr svoje „bitevné pole“ nielen Umberto Eco, Richard Rorty či Stanley Fish – ktorí do veľkej miery podnietili diskurz na túto tému –, ale aj v súčasnosti rozrastajúca sa základňa literárnych a kultúrnych kritikov. Leszek Drong, profesor angličtiny na univerzite v Silesii v Poľsku, je so svojou publikáciou *Disciplining the New Pragmatism*, vydanou v anglickom jazyku, príkladom prieniku filozofie a literárno-kultúrnej teórie na poli pragmatizmu.

Nové priestory, nové horizonty. V diele *Disciplining New Pragmatism* sa popri analýze kľúčových postáv novej vlny pragmatizmu hľadajú horizonty literárno-filozofického vymedzenia pragmatizmu a neopragmatizmu, pričom čitateľ môže spoznať implicitný motív celého diela ako pokus o reformuláciu a prehodnotenie fúzie pragmatizmu s antiesencializmom a antifundacionizmom. Explicitný zámer autora, ukázať, akým spôsobom sa prejavuje súčasný vplyv neopragmatizmu na literárne vedy, je motivovaný presvedčením, ku ktorému závery tohto diela smerujú: *Teoretizovanie konštruované ako účelný spôsob diskurzívnej aktivity potvrdenej vhodnou rétorikou dokáže zvýrazniť efektivnosť našich kritických praktík* (s. 17). Zámerom autora v tomto prípade však nie je vytvoriť príspevok k teórii literárnej kritiky, ale je ním korekcia jej *excesov*. Predstavením špecifickej funkcie a využitia jazyka sa poukazuje na to, že jazyk ako nezávislý systém arbitrárne spojených znakov už neslúži ako sprítomňujúca reprezentácia akéhosi stavu vecí či objektívnej reality. Akademický výkon preto nespočíva v čo najvernejšej reprezentácii problémov, ktoré má predstaviť, ale jeho hodnotu predstavuje „performatívna dimenzia každej kritikej výpovede“ (s. 226). V kontexte, kde sa zohľadňuje predovšetkým efekt prednesených informácií, sa rétorika predkladá ako možnosť navrátiť literárnym štúdiám ich kľúčovú pozíciu v rámci akademických disciplín pomocou zdokonalenia ich sebanarácie. A tak aj autor predkladá svoju verziu narácie prienikov neopragmatizmu a literárnej teórie, ktorá sa odvíja v dvoch dejstvách. Prvé dve kapitoly predstavujú charakter hlavných protagonistov príbehu, ktorými sú Richard Rorty a Stanley Fish, ale aj Steven Mailloux, Steven Knapp a Jeffrey Stout. Druhé dejstvo v podobe tretej kapitoly autor využíva na predstavenie vlastnej koncepcie *neosofistického pragmatizmu*, ktorá je podnietená fúziou *jasne definovanej tradície amerického pragmatizmu a zreteľne sofistických inšpirácií* (s. 226 – 229).

Aké sú však kritériá definície pragmatistickej tradície? *Zaujatost' skutočnými faktami* – alebo hlavný hybný motív pragmatizmu podľa slov jeho zakladateľa Charlesa Sandersa Peircea – podnecuje na dlhú dobu nesprávnu interpretáciu pragmatizmu ako esencializmu

a fundacionizmu, hľadajúcich adekvátne a „privilegované“ reprezentácie určitého objektívneho „stavu vecí“. Populárny fundament pragmatizmu sa však ďalej postupne formuje pod záštitou úspechu a popularity Williama Jamesa a Johna Deweyho a neskôr pod vplyvom postanalytickej filozofie. Pod vplyvom stále sa rozrastajúcej narácie nového sebauvedomenia sa však postupne vymedzuje vlastný priestor na postulovanie problémov, a to je dôvod, prečo sa L. Drong so svojim dielom dištancuje od detailného opisu širšieho historického kontextu klasického pragmatizmu, a reformulované problematiky zasadzuje priamo do kontextu univerzity 21. storočia.

Hlavní protagonisti „rétorickej vynaliezavosti“. L. Drong manévruje medzi jemnými odtieňmi rozmanitých a členitých pozícií súčasného diskurzu a – ako nám prezrádza názov – rozvrhuje kritickú štúdiu teórie, rétoriky a cieľov literárnych štúdií *nového pragmatizmu*.

Prvá kapitola oboznamuje čitateľa so základnými pojmami Rortyho „konečného slovníka“ (final vocabulary), pričom jeho koncepciu inštrumentálneho využitia jazyka sleduje až k polemikám, ktoré Rorty viedol s Umberto Ecom na tému *intentio operis* – zámeru textu. Autor ponúka kritický pohľad odhaľujúci nedostatky a nebezpečenstvá Rortyho ironizmu a relativizmu, ukazuje, že napriek všemožnej snahe sa ani sám Rorty nedokáže zbaviť filozofickej abstraktnosti (s. 70) a že aj v jeho diele mnoho autorov pozoruje to, čo on sám tak teatrálné odsudzuje: neplodné, ale aj prítiažlivé, provokujúce a veľkolepé reformulovanie *statu quo* (s. 73). Mnohí, ktorí v poslednej dobe voči Rortymu zaujímajú odmietavé stanovisko, poukazujú na to, že Rorty sám používa „zbrane“ súperov, ktorého sa snaží zatlačiť do kúta, a stopy zahladzuje rafinovanou rétorikou. Rorty sa usiluje odstrániť z filozofie epistemologické problémy reprezentácie a vo svojom diele *Filozofia a zrkadlo prírody* sa snaží ukázať, že dokonca aj analytická filozofia – ktorej tradícia je substrátom samotnej Rortyho pozície – údajne vytvára neutrálny rámec skúmania a celej kultúry. Otázka, či a do akej miery sa môžeme vzdať nároku na akýkoľvek neutrálny rámec, sa stáva ústrednou témou neopragmatistického hnutia na poli filozofie, ako aj literárnej teórie, ktorá navyše neraz obe roviny navzájom prepája v problematizácii procesu a pojmu interpretácie. Dá sa však hovoriť o adekvátnom rámci interpretácie, alebo ju ponecháme v pevnom zovretí „kontingencie liberálneho spoločenstva“? Keďže dielo profesora Dronga *Disciplining the New Pragmatism* nenecháva túto otázku nedotknutú, ba práve naopak, sleduje všemožné – staré či nové – variácie jej kladenia, zaslúži si pozornosť súčasného čitateľa v oblasti literárnych štúdií či súčasnej filozofie.

Predmety záujmu autora, akými sú neopragmatická kritika teórie, koncepcie významu či funkcia rétoriky, sa zvyrazňujú v dvoch medzikapitolách, ktoré dielu dodávajú optimálnu akceleráciu. Prvá s názvom *Post-Mortem teórii*, rozoberajúca snahu Michaela a Knappa pristupovať k teórii ako k špecifickej verzii praxe a snahu Stouta vyjasniť podmienky kritického diskurzu zbavením sa kategórie významu, ukazuje, že v daných koncepciách odlišnosť v riešení problematiky spočíva nielen v systémovej rovine, ale aj v spôsobe rétorickej artikulácie daných problémov. Na tejto rovine vyjadrenia kniha predkladá výstižnú dilemu, či je vôbec možné za týchto podmienok ašpirovať na artikuláciu definície procesu a pojmu interpretácie, ktorá by obsiahla celý diapazón aspektov v porozumení tohto fenoménu a vyhla sa pritom vlastným kritickým preferenciám či motívom.

Metamorfóza Fishovho radikálneho antiesencializmu a silného antifundacionizmu na

umiernenejšie pozície je predmetom kritickej analýzy, ktorá oboznamuje čitateľa s projektom a základnou terminológiou Fishovho neopragmatizmu so zameraním na koncept interpretatívnych komunít. Pozíciám neopragmatizmu podľa autora Fish neunikne ani po zmene, ktorá nastáva v diele *Profesionálna korektnosť* (Professional Correctness), kde sa jeho koncepcia významu spája s dôrazom na intencionalitu autora. Predkladanie významu ako toho, čo zamýšľal autor, predznačuje odklon od antifundacionizmu, a to bez následného poskytnutia metodologického usmernenia. Ako je však ukázané, nie je to len Fish, ktorý kritiku teórie predkladá s vedomím absencie metodologických východísk. Tieto nedostatky neopragmatisti zahládzajú ako majstri ironických pozícií a provokatívnych paradoxov. Pozícia L. Dronga – napriek tomu, že nie je voči tejto situácii neutrálna – nevedie do slepej uličky rázneho kritického nesúhlasu, ktorú buduje názorová orientácia takého komentátora neopragmatizmu, akým je Terry Eagleton, v súčasnej Británii najvplyvnejší akademický literárny kritik. Napriek Drongovmu zámeru „preskúmať niektoré rétorické ‚slepé uličky‘, ktoré vykresľujú Fishove názory ako nekonzistentné s jeho vlastnými pragmatickými presvedčeniami“ (s. 101), autor sa zdržiava literárne expresívnej, ba až prehnane uštipačnej kritiky Fishovho filozofického názoru – ktorá nie je v kruhoch súčasnej literárnej teórie ničím výnimočným – a ponúka rétoricky schodnejšiu reakciu na excesy „antifundacionistického fundacionizmu“.

Neosofistický pragmatizmus. Aj s pomocou výskumu spôsobov, ako texty analyzovaných autorov pôsobia a fungujú v rozličných kontextoch, sa v tomto diele postuluje a demaskuje kríza humanitných vied, a to predovšetkým literárnych štúdií. Autor sa dotýka problematiky z rozličných uhlov pohľadu, pričom sleduje fungovanie a prostredie výskumu na univerzitách, dôsledky odstránenia rozdielu medzi vedcom-bádateľom (scholar) a kritikom, interdisciplinaritu literárnych štúdií a v neposlednom rade kladie otázku: Čo robiť s výsledkami výskumu literárneho kritika (s. 181 – 200)? Hľadanie publika, ktorého by sa literárna teória nemala za žiadnych okolností vzdať, sa spája s reartikuláciou sofistickej dispozície využitia jazyka a „umenia vedome produkovať diskurz, ktorý má kapacitu ovplyvniť poslucháča/čitateľa“ (s. 212). Krok smerom k *neosofistickému pragmatizmu* urobil už pred vyše 2000 rokmi Protagoras, ktorý sa tu stáva prométovsou figúrou dejín rétoriky, literárnej teórie a kriticismu, a predovšetkým prvým profesionálnym filológom. Logocentrizmus, ktorý – ako naznačuje autor – by bolo možné rehabilitovať, súvisí so sofistickým dôrazom na prioritu logu, ktorý nie je metafyzicky založený, ale má korene v empirickom poznaní účinkov logu, ktorý nielenže spája človeka a svet, ale aj ovplyvňuje ľudské názory a emócie. Dôrazné uvedomenie si sily logu prinieslo sofistom ovocie v podobe *dôkladnej lingvistickej senzibility* (s. 213), ktorú by súčasná literárna teória mala nadobudnúť vo svojej snahe stimulovať potencionálne a aktuálne publikum, a dostať sa tak z celkovej krízy humanitných vied, čiastočne súvisiacej s neschopnosťou, ale aj so zábrami pri efektívnom využívaní krásy a sily jazyka.

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JOHANNES FEHR – PETR KOUBA (eds.):

Dynamic Structure. Language as an Open System (Dynamická štruktúra. Jazyk ako otvorený systém)

Prague: Litteraria Pragensia 2007, 262 pp.

Predkladaná kolektívna monografia je úspešným výsledkom medzinárodnej spolupráce curyšského Colegium Helveticum a pražského Centra pre teoretické štúdiá. V troch častiach mapuje priame i nepriame dedičstvo Ferdinanda de Saussura v bohatom kontexte filozofických vplyvov a filiácií.

Úvodná štúdia **Johannesa Fehra** sleduje Saussurov myšlienkový vývoj od jeho prvej práce, ktorá mu priniesla nemalú reputáciu, až ku konceptom známym z *Kurzu všeobecnej lingvistiky*. J. Fehr bohato čerpá zo Saussurových osobných poznámok a záznamov, na ktorých ukazuje, ako sa Saussure postupne prepracúva od snahy redukovať jazyk na „jednoduché substancie“ a budovať lingvistiku ako axiomatickú vedu istého druhu k známemu dynamickému poňatiu jazyka ako znakového systému. Čitateľ je tak skutočne zasvätený uvedený nie výslovne do semiológie ako takej, ale predovšetkým do myslenia Ferdinanda de Saussura.

Aj nasledujúce dve štúdie sa potýkajú priamo so Saussurovým odkazom. Sú rámcované témou *Systém a funkcia*, ktorá tvorí prvý blok práce. **Jan Sokol** sa zamýšľa nad vzťahom jazyka a skúsenosti a ukazuje, že nejedná sa o amorfnú skúsenosť, ale že skúsenosť sama obsahuje štruktúrne delenia, ktoré slúžia na praktickú orientáciu vo svete. **Ondřej Sládek** sa vo svojej stati zaoberá recepciou Saussura v prostredí Pražského lingvistického krúžku. Odmieta tradované tvrdenie, podľa ktorého Pražský krúžok iba „aplikoval“ princípy saussurovskej lingvistiky na literatúru. Sládek ukazuje, že hoci Mukařovský adoptuje saussurovskú terminológiu, rozchádza sa so Saussurom v rovine základných teoretických východísk a vytvára nový konceptuálny systém. Sládekove argumenty zaujmú zaiste mnohých, ktorí sa príbuzným témam venujú.

Druhá sekcia *Jazyk a myslenie* sa venuje vzťahu štrukturalizmu a fenomenológie. **Michal Ajvaz** sa púšťa do hľadania novej syntézy týchto dvoch prístupov. Ukazuje nezlučiteľnosť saussurovského (diferenciálneho) poňatia jazyka s husserlovskou fenomenológiou. Vďaka Merleau-Pontyho reformuláciám rôznych aspektov konštitúcie zmyslu v jazyku dochádza k zblíženiu perspektív, ktorá umožňuje použiť fenomenologickú myšlienku intencionality ako základ diferenciálneho poňatia jazyka, uzákladneného vo svete nášho života. Ako rozšírenie tejto témy možno chápať príspevok **Petra Koubu**, ktorý sa pokúša prekročiť nezmieriteľnosť intencionálneho (fenomenologického) a diferenciálneho poňatia jazyka revidovaním epistemologických predpokladov neskorého diela Merleau-Pontyho tak, aby umožňoval prístup k mysleniu inakosti bez toho, aby bola *inakosť* Iného redukovaná pomyselnou jednotou *ipseity*. Z toho pramení celý rad otázok o definovaní nových vzťahov medzi prediskurzívnym a diskurzívnym, ipseitou a druhým v rovine konštitúcie žitého sveta, a to v takom druhu myslenia, ktoré radikalizáciou konečnosti a kontingencie ľudského bytia prekročí horizont moderného transcendentálno-empirického rozštiepenia človeka. Obe merleau-pontyovské štúdie považujeme za hodné osobitého zreteľa. **Petr Urban** sa v tejto sekcii podrobne venuje otázke jazyka a myslenia

v Husserlovej fenomenológii. Podobne poctivým príspevkom je štúdia profesora z Hankuk University **Yong-Ho Choia** o Ricœurovej interpretácii Saussura a o otázke zmyslu.

Tretiu časť s názvom *Podmienky a hranice subjektivity* otvára **Alice Kliková** aktualizáciou Uexküllovej biosemiotiky. Uexküllov revolučný krok v biológii spočíva v pokuse zbaviť sa antropocentrického i mechanistického poňatia živého sveta prostredníctvom konceptu významuplného životného okolia (*Umwelt*). A. Kliková ponúka ako základný náčrt jeho koncepcie, tak aj následnú kritiku, ktorá môže slúžiť ako východisko novej koncepcie skúsenosti ako „otvoreného systému“ dynamickej produkcie nových štruktúr, prekračujúceho pascu moderného myslenia a jeho transcendentálnych nárokov. Príspevok je ukážkou pozitívnych možností interdisciplinárnych inšpirácií.

Ako teoretický *bricoleur* sa uvádza **Emil Volek** vo svojej štúdií, v ktorej sa pokúša semiotické koncepty obohatené o ostenzívnu teóriu jazyka inkorporovať do konceptu *Umwelt*-u a následne do teórie komunikácie. Vydarenú prezentáciu Lacanovho prekríženia štrukturalizmu a psychoanalýzy predvádza **Josef Fulka** v sumáre Lacanovho chápania signifikantu a signifikácie v jeho dominantných konceptoch. Do pokusov o prekonávanie modernej podoby filozofického poňatia subjektivity zapadá aj štúdia **Luisa Armanda**, ktorého výklad vzťahu jazyka a interaktivity v bohatom kontexte cez Alana Turinga až po Paula Virilia môže byť pre mnohých podnetný.

Predkladaná kniha je zaiste čímsi viac než iba súborom štúdií. Je skôr aktuálnym výsekom toho, čo sa na filozofickej scéne starého kontinentu deje v ostatných desaťročiach, ale i dnes, a kam sa uberajú línie myslenia z tej či onej strany, viažuce sa na otázky a problémy, ktoré pre nás otvoril Ferdinand de Saussure.

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**MEDZINÁRODNÁ REGIONÁLNA KONFERENCIA UNESCO
O BIOETIKE**

V dňoch 21. – 22. 1. 2009 sa pod záštitou Katedry etiky (Inštitútu filozofie a etiky) Filozofickej fakulty Prešovskej univerzity konala medzinárodná regionálna konferencia UNESCO s názvom *Metodologické a metodické otázky bioetiky v súčasnosti*. Miestom konania bolo Kongresové centrum SAV Academia v Starej Lesnej. Početné zastúpenie účastníkov nielen zo Slovenska, ale aj z ďalších krajín – Talianska, Rumunska, Maďarska, Poľska a Českej republiky – je dôkazom toho, že téma a problematika bioetiky sú v súčasnosti veľmi naliehavou záležitosťou nielen pre znalcov z oblasti etiky, ale aj pre odborníkov z iných odborov.

Nastolené otázky konferencie sú často aj prostredníctvom médií pomerne aktuálnou tematikou pre širokú verejnosť, dokonca sa dostávajú do pozornosti aj v oblasti politiky a legislatívy. Metodické a metodologické otázky bioetiky a problematika s tým spojená patria v súčasnosti bezpochyby k významným súčasťam etiky, o čom svedčí celková expanzia odborných textov, ktorú možno registrovať v poslednej dobe. Ukazuje sa, že nie všetko, čo je technicky možné, je aj morálne prípustné, pretože vedecko-technický pokrok je pre ľudstvo prospešný a osožný potiaľ, pokiaľ sa jeho cieľom nestane manipulácia so samotným človekom. Bioetické dilemy sú často dôsledkom stretu tradičných predstáv spoločnosti o otázkach života a smrti s modernými výtvarkami biologických a lekárskejších vied, no pri ich analýzach by sme nemali zabúdať ani na etické a filozofické koncepcie.

Vysvetlenie odlišností medzi metodologickými východiskami a závermi v bioetike bolo jadrom vystúpenia Vasila Gluchmana (FF PU Prešov) hneď v úvode plenárneho zasadnutia konferencie. Konštatoval, že na základe toho, čo rozumieme pod bioetikou, a s ohľadom na metodologické východiská prístupu k danej problematike existuje viacero druhov bioetiky. Minimálne môžeme uvažovať o filozoficko-etickom, biologicko-medicínskom, nábožensko-teologickom, sociologickom a prípadne právnickom prístupe k bioetike. Autor sa zamerával tiež na otázku spoločných prienikov týchto prístupov, najmä pokiaľ ide o kompetencie a závery vyplývajúce z rozdielnych metodologických východísk.

Na problémy súčasnej bioetiky poukázala Eva Smolková (FiÚ SAV Bratislava), zdôrazňujúc, že pojem bioetiky slúži v súčasnosti na označenie množstva rôznych axiologických, etických, biologických, medicínskych a iných problémov. Pokúsila sa preto naznačiť, aké problémy sa v jej rámci riešia i ako sa profilujú jednotlivé problémové okruhy. Zároveň predstavila bioetiku zo systémového hľadiska, načrtla jej užšie a širšie vymedzenie a problémové okruhy, priblížila metódy, ktoré sa preferujú v rámci jednotlivých vymedzení.

O budúcnosti v súčasných koncepciách bioetiky informoval Josef Kuře (MU Brno) akcentovaním, že bioetické metódy a prístupy fundamentálnej bioetiky sa začali zameriavať predovšetkým na praktické (a pragmatické) riešenie nových vznikajúcich etických dilem v biomedicíne a v biotechnológiách. Podľa neho bioetický diskurz bol ovplyvnený multidisciplinárťou a rastúcim pluralizmom metodických prístupov. Ďalej konštatoval, že

v súčasnom vývoji bioetiky sa dajú identifikovať najmenej dva momenty, ktoré zdôrazňujú budúcnosť ako významnú kategóriu bioetického diskurzu: globálna bioetika a udržateľný rozvoj medicíny. V skúmaných metodologických prístupoch a konceptoch bioetiky sa identifikované prvky javia ako nosné pre bioetiku orientovanú do budúcnosti (*etika ante quam*) vrátane prínosu poňatí, ktoré nepatria k hlavnému smeru bioetiky, ako je napr. *diskurzívna etika*, príp. *etika ošetrovateľstva*.

Etikou telesnosti v kontexte hľadania teoretických a metodologických východísk súčasnej bioetiky sa bližšie zaoberala Viera Bilasová (FF PU Prešov). Vo svojom vystúpení poukázala na skutočnosť, že súčasná bioetika čelí dvom skupinám výziev, na ktoré v dôsledku krízy teoretických a metodologických východísk už nie je schopná efektívne odpovedať. Prvú skupinu tvoria problémy vyvolané súčasným stupňom rozvoja vedy, techniky, ekonomiky a politiky, ktoré menia kvalitu ľudského života, ale aj života vôbec. Druhú skupinu výziev podľa nej tvoria otázky vyvolané globalizáciou, globálnym otepľovaním, globálnou ekologickou krízou a vyčerpávaním surovínových energetických a potravinových zdrojov. Všetky tradičné i nové otázky bioetiky dostávajú v podmienkach globalizácie kvalitatívne novú dimenziu.

Metodologickým a metodickým otázkam bioetiky v súčasnosti sa venovali prezentujúci v jednotlivých sekciách, ktoré nadväzovali na načrtnuté problémy plenárneho zasadnutia. Filozoficko-etickej reflexii otázok bioetiky sa venovala Zuzana Kiczková (FiF UK Bratislava) v znovu/premyslení argumentačných koncepcií (na príklade problematiky interrupcií), pretože podľa nej v bioetike sa často odohrávajú ostro polarizované polemiky. Jednu z konkrétnych odpovedí hľadá v znovupremyslení vzájomného vzťahu medzi právom na život a povinnosťou rešpektovať toto právo. Stefan Konstańczak (Poľsko) vo svojom vystúpení uvažoval nad významom záujmu spoločnosti v súvislosti s bioetickými diskusiami týkajúcimi sa napríklad aj utrpenia. Ivan Hruška (FF UHK Hradec Králové) sa zamerával na interdisciplinárne otázky filozofie, etiky, bioetiky a etiky medicíny. Jadrom jeho zámeru bolo poukázať na akútny význam včasného, aktívneho a prognostického filozofického a interdisciplinárneho axiologického a etického výskumu. Cieľom príspevku Adely Leškovej Blahovej (FF PU Prešov) bolo predstaviť etiku sociálnych dôsledkov ako ďalšie možné teoretické východisko pri riešení bioetických problémov a zdôvodniť relevantnosť jej aplikácie v oblasti bioetiky. Grzegorz Grzybek (Poľsko) zdôraznil, že kvalita ľudského života je podmienená snahou o rozvoj etickej osoby.

V sekcii spoločenskovednej reflexie otázok bioetiky sa Beáta Balogová (FF PU Prešov) zaoberala problematikou mobbingu v podmienkach Slovenska, ktorého dôsledky majú nielen individuálnu, ale aj celospoločenskú rovinu. V počiatkových teoreticko-empirických skúmaníach poukazuje na jeho individuálne, hlavne psychické a somatické dôsledky, avšak dnes túto formu manipulácie môžeme vidieť aj v jeho ničivej etickej a materiálnej rovine; Zvlášť vtedy, ak predmetom skúmania je zdravotnícky personál a jeho zverenci, čiže pacienti. Miła Kwapiszewska-Antas (Poľsko) upozornila na diskusie a riziká spojené s biotechnologickým výskumom. Otázkam génových technológií, ktoré nás núti otvárať a riešiť nové otázky, dotýkajúce sa podstaty človeka, jeho prirodzenosti a telesnosti, sa venovala Adriana Švirková (FF PU Prešov). Zvlášť aktuálnymi sa stávajú tie oblasti skúmania, v ktorých morálne dimenzie nadobúdajú nový rozmer a stávajú sa aktuálnym a pozitívnym fenoménom.

Počas obidvoch dní konferencie paralelne pracovala anglická sekcia, v ktorej prevlá-

dali vystúpenia najmä zahraničných hostí, no bohatá bola aj diskusia i vzájomná výmena názorov so slovenskými účastníkmi. Corneliu Simut (Rumunsko) vo svojom vystúpení priblížil veľmi zaujímavé názory talianskeho liberálneho laického teológa Vata Mancusa na otázky života a smrti. Jan Payne (LF UK Praha) poukázal na dôsledky, štruktúru a funkciu informovaného súhlasu. Liberálny protestantský pohľad na možnosť výskumu embryonálnych buniek prezentoval Igor Kišš (EBF UK Bratislava). Účastníčky z Central European University v Budapešti (Maďarsko) Enikő Demény a Petra Bárd sa zaoberali antropologickými a právnickými otázkami génových bánk. Barbara Bottalico (Taliansko) sa venovala jazykovým otázkam zjednocovania európskej právnej terminológie týkajúcej sa bioetiky. Ekonomickými otázkami eugeniky v kontexte 19. storočia sa vo svojom príspevku zaoberal Ján Kalajtzis (FF PU v Prešove). Dôstojnosť a ľudská dôstojnosť ako metodologický základ bioetiky tvorili jadro vystúpenia Vasila Gluchmana. Rokovanie v tejto sekcii ukončila bohatá diskusia a výmena vzájomných informácií o situácii v oblasti bioetického výskumu v jednotlivých krajinách.

K najzaujímavejším príspevkom v sekcii teologickej reflexie otázok bioetiky patrilo vystúpenie Martina Kolečáka (KU Ružomberok) o metodológii teologickej bioetiky, ako aj príspevok zaoberajúci sa Singerovou teóriou druhizmu, ktorý prezentovali Innocent-Maria Szaniszló a Michal Kuřha (TF KU Košice).

K podnetným patrila aj sekcia zaoberajúca sa didaktikou bioetiky, v ktorej Jan Payne a Pavel Marťásek (LF UK Praha) prezentovali PhD. program v bioetike na Karlovej univerzite v Prahe; Marta Gluchmanová (FVT TU Prešov) sa venovala vzťahu učiteľskej etiky k výučbe bioetiky, Gabriela Platková (FF PU Prešov) rozoberala metodologické východiská výučby bioetiky na školách v rámci etickej výchovy, Jana Trizuljaková a Mária Mojzešová (LF UK Bratislava) sa venovali reflexiám budúcich lekárov nad vzťahom lekár – pacient a Petr Jemelka (MU Brno) sa sústredil na bioetickú inšpiráciu v príprave budúcich učiteľov.

Úspešný priebeh medzinárodnej regionálnej konferencie UNESCO zameranej na metodologické a metodické aspekty bioetiky dopĺňala aj užitočná diskusia, ktorá často pokračovala aj po skončení pracovnej časti programu. Počas dvojdňového rokovania v rámci plenárneho zasadnutia a vystúpení v sekciiach odznelo vyše 50 referátov, ktorých texty budú publikované v zborníku. Záujem o vystúpenia aj samotný priebeh konferencie jednoznačne dokazujú, že problematika spojená s bioetikou nie je iba módnou záležitosťou, ale odrazom hlbokého záujmu o nastolené otázky nielen v prítomnosti, ale aj vo vzťahu k budúcnosti.

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Katedra etiky Inštitútu filozofie a etiky FF PU v Prešove v rámci riešenia projektu Európskeho sociálneho fondu *Skvalitnenie odborného vzdelávania v rámci študijných programov etika na Filozofickej fakulte PU v Prešove* v spolupráci s ďalšími odborníkmi zo Slovenska a Českej republiky vydala v roku 2008 osem vysokoškolských učebníc pre potreby výučby aplikovanej etiky.

Ide o tieto učebnice: **Viera Bilasová a kolektív: *Etika a medicína***. V tejto práci autorky (Viera Bilasová, Silvia Malankievičová, Lubomíra Romanová a Viera Žemberová) vymedzujú filozofické východiská a metodologické problémy etickej reflexie aktuálnych otázok súčasnej medicíny v spoločenských kontextoch. Práca sa skladá z dvoch častí: *Filozofické východiská medicínskej etiky* a *Etické problémy medicínskej praxe*. Ďalšou učebnicou je **Učiteľská etika** autorov **Marty Gluchmanovej a Vasila Gluchmana**, v ktorej venujú pozornosť vývoju profesijnej etiky učiteľa na Slovensku v 20. storočí, terminologickým otázkam učiteľskej etiky, rozoberajú niektoré koncepcie učiteľskej etiky a zameriavajú sa na možnosť aplikácie princípov a hodnôt etiky sociálnych dôsledkov v učiteľskej etike. **Petr Jemelka a Slavomír Lesňák** v práci *Environmentálna etika* prezentujú genézu a typológiu environmentálnej etickej teórie. Okrem iného sa zaoberajú vymedzením základných pojmov, dejinami a hlavnými smermi environmentálnej filozofie a etiky. Do svojej práce zahrnuli aj prehľad slovenských autorov zaoberajúcich sa touto problematikou. V práci *Bioetika* autori **Petr Jemelka, Vasil Gluchman a Adela Lešková-Blahová** venujú pozornosť teoretickému statusu bioetiky a hlavnej kategórii, ktorou je život. Ďalej sa zaoberajú antropickou dimenziou a axiologickým zakotvením bioetiky, činnosťou bioetických komisií a deklaráciami UNESCO k bioetickej problematike.

Silvia Malankievičová v práci *Profesijná etika* reaguje na teoretickú, didaktickú a spoločenskú potrebu týkajúcu sa etickej reflexie problémov v jednotlivých profesiách spoločenskej praxe. Východiskovou platformou je etika diskurzu; ďalej sa zaoberá predmetom a významom profesijnej etiky v spleti filozofických a sociologických tradícií. **Mária Nemčeková** s kolektívom autorov (Beáta Balogová, Adela Lešková-Blahová, Jan Payne, Mária Tabaková) pripravili učebnicu *Etika v ošetrovatelstve*, ktorá prináša poznatky o človeku ako predmete ošetrovateľskej starostlivosti z hľadiska epistemologického, etického i morálno-praktického. Teoretické východisko tvorí koncepcia človeka v paradigmatickom systéme ošetrovateľstva a problematika morálneho rozhodovania v práci sestier. Práca *Etika v manažmente* je výsledkom práce kolektívu trinástich autorov (medzi nimi aj Jiřího Bláhu, Zdeňka Dyrtra, Anny Remišovej, Emílie Sičákovéj-Beblavej a ďalších) pod vedením **Gabriely Platkovej**. Obsah učebnice tvoria témy zamerané na ekonomické a etické východiská manažérskej etiky, koncepcie systémového prístupu k manažérskej etike, funkcie a miesto morálnych hodnôt v manažmente, etický rozhodovací proces, aktuálne trendy vodcovstva (leadership), sociálnu a spoločenskú zodpovednosť atď. **Jana Muránska** s kolektívom (Martin Lačný a Daniela Navrátilová) sa v práci *Hospodárska etika* venovali takým témam, ako sú morálne hodnotenie ekonomického života, etické teórie v kontexte obchodu a podnikania, spoločenská zodpovednosť podnikov, etika v riadení podnikov atď.

Záujemcovia o uvedené publikácie môžu kontaktovať sekretariát Inštitútu filozofie a etiky FF PU v Prešove (kovalakova@unipo.sk).